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On the Secrecy Performance of SWIPT Receiver
Architectures with Multiple Eavesdroppers
Furqan Jameel, Shurjeel Wyne, Syed Junaid Nawaz, Junaid Ahmed, and Kanapathippillai Cumanan
Abstract—Physical layer security (PLS) has been shown to hold
promise as a new paradigm for securing wireless links. In contrast
with the conventional cryptographic techniques, PLS methods
exploit the random fading in wireless channels to provide link
security. As the channel dynamics prevent a constant rate of
secure communications between the legitimate terminals, the
outage probability of the achievable secrecy rate is used as a
measure of the secrecy performance. This work investigates the
secrecy outage probability of a simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) system, which operates in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers that also have the energy
harvesting capability. The loss in secrecy performance due to
eavesdropper collusion, i.e., information sharing between the
eavesdroppers to decode the secret message, is also analyzed. We
derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability
for Nakagami-m fading on the links and imperfect channel
estimation at the receivers. Our analysis considers different
combinations of the separated and the integrated SWIPT receiver
architectures at the receivers. Numerical results are provided to
validate our analysis.
Index Terms—Achievable Secrecy Rate, Outage Probability,
Nakagami-m Fading
I. INTRODUCTION
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) systems have spurred considerable research interest
in both academia and industry [1]. The SWIPT technique
provides significant convenience to its users by efficiently
utilizing the radio frequency (RF) signal for both information
and power transfer [2]. However, SWIPT systems require a
special receiver design to support the dual capability of energy
harvesting (EH) and information decoding (ID). In the liter-
ature, two broad categories of SWIPT receiver architectures
have been proposed namely the separated and the integrated
receiver architectures [1]. The separated receiver architecture
has dedicated separate units for ID and EH. However, this
increases the complexity and cost of the receiver hardware [3].
In contrast, the integrated receiver architecture has a unified
circuitry to perform ID and EH jointly, which reduces the
hardware costs [3].
Varshney et al. in [4] were the first to propose the transmis-
sion of information and energy simultaneously. They devel-
oped a capacity-energy function to characterize the fundamen-
tal tradeoff in performance between simultaneous information
and power transfer. In [5], the authors extended the work
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of [4] to frequency-selective channels with additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). It was shown in [5] that a non-trivial
tradeoff exists for information transfer versus energy transfer
via power allocation. A SWIPT system under co-channel
interference was studied in [6]. The authors derived optimal
designs to achieve outage-energy tradeoffs and rate-energy
tradeoffs. In [7] the authors considered the performance of a
SWIPT system with imperfect channel state information (CSI)
at the transmitter. Networks that employ pure wireless power
transfer were studied in [8] and [9]. In [8], the authors studied
a hybrid network that overlaid an uplink cellular network with
randomly deployed power beacons, which charged mobiles
wirelessly. The authors then derived the tradeoffs between
different network parameters under an outage constraint on
the data links.
The broadcast nature of wireless signals implies that nodes
other than the intended receiver may also receive the trans-
mitted message, which results in information leakage. Al-
though cryptography-based techniques are conventionally used
to secure transmitted information, the high computational
complexity of these techniques consumes a significant amount
of energy [10]. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) has
been proposed as an alternative for securing wireless com-
munications by exploiting the channel characteristics such as
fading, noise, and interferences [11]. The secrecy performance
of a cooperative network was investigated in [12], [13]; secrecy
for interference limited networks was studied in [14] and for
cognitive radio networks in [15], [16], [17]. In[18], the authors
analyzed the secrecy performance of a multicast network in
which the transmitter broadcasted its information to a set of
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
The authors then proposed power minimization and secrecy
rate maximization schemes for the considered multicasting
secrecy network. The security of large-scale networks has
also been characterized in terms of connectivity [19], cov-
erage [20] and capacity [21]. Researchers have also consid-
ered so-called artificial noise generation techniques to reduce
the signal-to-interference ratio of the eavesdropper channel
while minimizing the interference to the legitimate link [22],
[23]. The authors in [24], [25] studied cooperative jamming,
whereby a relay transmitted an interfering signal towards the
eavesdropper while the source broadcasted its message. In
[26], secure beamforming techniques have been explored to
maximize the received power at the legitimate receiver. The
PLS techniques are naturally applicable to SWIPT but the
design of an optimal PLS techniques for SWIPT systems is a
non-trivial task since it needs to also consider the efficiency of
the wireless power transfer. In general, if a power receiver is
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a potential eavesdropper then any increase in the information
signal power to improve the power transfer efficiency may also
compromise the message secrecy [6]. Therefore, the inherent
tradeoff between power efficiency and information security in
a SWIPT system merits detailed examination. The authors
in [27] investigated the maximization of secrecy throughput
for SWIPT systems. In particular, they considered power
allocation between EH and ID to provide an optimal secure
SWIPT solution. In the same work an analytical expression
for the secrecy outage probability was also derived. In [28],
the authors investigated the secrecy performance of a SWIPT
system with the separated receiver SWIPT architecture em-
ployed at the eavesdropper and κ− µ faded links. In [29] the
authors introduced an artificial noise-aided precoding scheme
to maximize the secrecy rate. In [30] the authors studied
the secrecy capacity of an EH orthogonal-frequency-division-
multiplexing network. All the sub-carriers were allocated an
identical power and the power-splitting technique was used to
coordinate ID and EH. In [31] the authors analyzed secure
beamforming for an amplify-and-forward two-way relaying
SWIPT network and proposed a zero-forcing based sub-
optimal solution to maximize the secrecy of the considered
network.
In the SWIPT literature most investigations have considered
only the separated receiver architecture [27], [29], [30], [31].
Furthermore, multiple eavesdroppers when considered are of-
ten assumed to operate independently, whereas in many practi-
cal scenarios these eavesdroppers may collaborate to enhance
their secret message decoding capability [32]. Finally, the
achievable secrecy rate may degrade significantly under im-
perfect channel estimation at the legitimate receiver, whereas
imperfect CSI at the eavesdropper can prove beneficial for
the system’s secrecy performance. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, a comparative analysis of the secrecy performance
of the separated and integrated SWIPT architectures with
eavesdropper cooperation and imperfect CSI has not been
performed previously. Specifically, the main contributions of
the submitted work are listed as follows:
• We derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability with imperfect CSI knowledge at the receivers
and different combinations of the separated and the
integrated SWIPT architectures at the legitimate and the
eavesdropping receivers.
• The tradeoff between secrecy performance and harvested
energy is investigated.
• The loss in secrecy performance due to eavesdropper
cooperation is analyzed and compared with the non-
cooperative case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model. In Section III the closed-form
expressions for the outage probability are derived for different
receiver architectures. Section IV provides numerical results
along with relevant discussion. In Section V, some concluding
remarks are given.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a SWIPT system as shown
in Fig. 1 in which the Access Point (AP) transmits a secure
message to the legitimate receiver S, which has simultaneous
EH and ID capability. This transmission is also received by
N eavesdropping nodes that are admitted into the network
for EH-only but exploit their SWIPT receiver architectures
in an attempt to intercept the secret communication between
AP and S [33]. Since the eavesdroppers, denoted by E =
{Ei|i = 1, 2, ...N}, are also part of the network - the AP is
assumed to have CSI for the main channel to node S as well
as for the N wiretap channels [33]. All nodes are considered
to be equipped with single antennas.1 Our analysis considers
two types of receiver architectures for both S and E, i.e.,
the conventional separated receiver and the integrated receiver
architecture [3] shown in Fig. 2. In the separated receiver,
the RF signal after power-splitting (PS) is fed to separate
circuitry for ID and EH, whereas in the integrated receiver PS
between EH and ID takes place after the rectifier. The rectifier
of the integrated receiver also down-converts the RF signal for
ID, i.e., the down-conversion operation is integrated with the
energy receiver in this architecture. For both receiver types,
the fractional powers received for ID and EH are denoted by
0 ≤ ρ < 1 and 1− ρ, respectively.
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Fig. 1. System Model.
Consider that the AP transmits signal s with power P . The
signal received at S can then be written as
ys =
√
P
P losss
hˆss+ ns, (1)
where hˆs represents the channel gain estimated by S and ns
denotes the zero-mean variance N0 additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) due to the receiver electronics at S. Addition-
ally, P losss =
(4pi)2dΞs
GtGrλ2c
is the path loss, where ds denotes the
distance between AP and S and Ξ is the path loss exponent.
Furthermore, λc is the carrier wavelength and Gt and Gr are
the antenna gains at AP and S, respectively.
Since S employs PS architecture, the received signal is
further divided into two streams for ID and EH. The signal at
the information decoder of S is given as
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P
P losss
hˆss+ ns
)
+ zs, (2)
1Analysis for multi-antenna nodes [34] will be reported in future work.
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Fig. 2. Separated and integrated receiver architectures of SWIPT [3].
where ρs is the power splitting factor at S and zs is the
signal processing noise at S, also distributed normally as
N (0, σ2s). Since 1 − ρs fraction of received power is used
for energy harvesting, thus the amount of harvested energy
at S, ignoring small amount of energy stored by antenna and
signal processing noise, can be written as [3]
EHs =
ζs(1− ρs)P |hˆs|2
P losss
, (3)
where ζs represents the power conversion efficiency at S.
The AP transmission is also picked up by the eavesdroppers,
the signal received at the information decoder of the i-th
eavesdropper is written as
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P
P lossie
hˆies+ nie
)
+ zie, (4)
where hˆie represents the channel gain estimated by the i-th
eavesdropper. Furthermore, nie = ne represents the thermal
noise distributed as N (0, N0) and zie = ze is the signal
processing noise distributed as N (0, σ2e), at the i-th eavesdrop-
per. Here the noise statistics are assumed identical due to all
eavesdroppers using the same type of hardware. For a tractable
analysis, we consider P lossie = P
loss
e and ρie = ρe∀i ∈ N .
Similar to (3), the amount of harvested energy at the i-th
eavesdropper can be written as [3]
EHie =
ζie(1− ρie)P |hˆie|2
P lossie
, (5)
where ζie is the power conversion efficiency at the i-th eaves-
dropper. Moreover, without loss of generality, we consider
ζie = ζe throughout this work. Finally, the receiver nodes
make an erroneous channel estimate due to their hardware
impairments modeled as [35], [36]
hˆk =
√
1− δ2khk + δkv, (6)
where k ∈ {s, ie}, hk represents the true channel amplitude
gain. The parameter 0 < δk < 1 is a measure of estimation
accuracy with δk = 0 for a perfect estimate. Additionally, v
is a normal random variable distributed as N (0, 1). Now by
substituting (6) into (2) we can express the signal received at
S as
ys =
√
ρs
(√
P (1− δ2s)
P losss
hss+
√
P
P losss
δsvs+ ns
)
+ zs,
(7)
and substituting (6) into (4) we can express the signal received
at i-th eavesdropper as
yie =
√
ρie
(√
P (1− δ2ie)
P losse
hies+
√
P
P losse
δievs+ nie
)
+ zie.
(8)
Using the above equations, the instantaneous signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the main channel can be written as
χs =
ρsΩs(1− δ2s)
(Ωsρsδ2s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
|hs|2, (9)
and the SNR for the i-th wiretap channel can be expressed as
χie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2ie)
(Ωeρsδ2ie + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
|hie|2, (10)
where Ωs = P/(P
loss
s ) and Ωe = P/(P
loss
e ). For subsequent
analysis, δie = δe, ∀i ∈ N is considered.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section closed form expressions for the secrecy
outage probability are derived separately for four different
cases that are based on the receiver types used at S and
E. Specifically, PSp−Spout denotes outage probability for the
case of separated receiver architectures at S and E, PSp−Inout
denotes the outage for separated receiver at S and integrated
receiver at E, P In−Spout is the outage for integrated receiver at
S and separated receiver at E, and P In−Inout denotes outage
probability for the case of integrated receivers at both S and
E. Each of these four cases are discussed first for the non-
cooperative eavesdropping scenario and later for cooperation
among the eavesdroppers.
A. Non-cooperative Eavesdroppers
In this scenario, the worst-case of the eavesdropper with
the maximum SNR is considered to decode the message. The
instantaneous SNR of the wiretap link can be re-written as
χe = max
i∈N
χie =
ρeΩe(1− δ2e)
(Ωeρsδ2e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
max
i∈N
|hie|2. (11)
where χie is Gamma distributed [37] with probability density
function (PDF) fχie(γie) =
[
mie(Ωieρieδ
2
ie+ρieN0+σ
2
ie)
ρie(1−δ2ie)γ¯ie
]mie ×
exp
(
−mie(Ωieρieδ2ie+ρieN0+σ2ie)γie
ρie(1−δ2ie)γ¯ie
)
× (γie)mie−1Γ(mie) . Then, the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the instantaneous
SNR of the wiretap link (i.e. random variable χe falling below
an arbitrary value γe), is given as
Fχe(γe) = Pr(χe < γe). (12)
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Now using statistical independence of the wiretap channels
and the CDF of a Gamma random variable [38], we obtain
Fχe(γe) = Pr(χ1e < γe, χ2e < γe, . . . , χNe < γe),
=
[
1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]r]N
,
(13)
The corresponding PDF can be written as
fχe(γe) =
dFχe(γe)
dγe
=
N(γe)
me−1
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
[
1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
me−1∑
r=0
1
r!
{
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
}r]N−1
× exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
, (14)
where γ¯e = ΩeE{maxi∈N |hie|2} represents the average SNR
of the wiretap link and me is the Nakagami-m fading severity
parameter for the wiretap link.
The PDF of the instantaneous SNR of the main link can be
obtained as [37]
fχs(γs) =
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
×
(γs)
ms−1 exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ2s+ρsN0+σ2s)γsρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
. (15)
The corresponding CDF is given as [37]
Fχs(γs) = 1− exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)ms−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]r
, (16)
where γ¯s = ΩsE{|hs|2} is the average SNR of the main link
and ms represents the Nakagami-m fading severity parameter
for the main link.
1) Separated Receivers at S and E: The achievable rates
for the main and wiretap links can be written as Cs = log2(1+
χs) and Ce = log2(1 + χe), respectively [3]. The achievable
secrecy rate Csec is defined as the non-negative difference
between the achievable rates of the main channel and wiretap
channel, which is expressed as Csec = [Cs−Ce]+. A secrecy
outage event occurs when Csec falls below some target rate
Rs > 0 [39], [40]. The secrecy outage probability is then
written as
PSp−Spout = Pr(Csec < Rs)
=
∫
∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γe)−1
0
fχs(γs)fχe(γe)dγsdγe,
=
∫
∞
0
Fχs(2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1)fχe(γe)dγe. (17)
Now using (14) and (15) in (17) and with the help of [41,
(8.352.4)], we obtain
PSp−Spout =
N
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
N−1∑
w=0
(
N − 1
w
)
(−1)w
Γ(me)Γ(ms)
×M(Ψ1,Ψ2),
(18)
where
M(a, b) =
∫
∞
0
(γe)
me−1 exp(−mea)Γ(me,mea)w
× Γ(ms,msb)dγe,
Ψ1 =
(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
,
Ψ2 =
(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
.
Furthermore, Γ(., .) is the upper incomplete Gamma function
and Γ(.) is the Gamma function [41]. The function M(a, b)
can be readily evaluated using any computational software.
2) Separated Receiver at S and Integrated Receiver at E:
In this case the achievable rate for the main link is Cs =
log2(1 + χs). On the wiretap link, the integrated receiver’s
ID channel can be modeled as a free-space optical intensity
channel [3]. The asymptotic high-SNR achievable rate for this
channel is expressed as Ce = log2(χe)+
1
2 log2
e
2pi , assuming
that the signal processing noise dominates the antenna noise
[3], [42]. Then using the approach of (17), we obtain
PSp−Inout =
∫
∞
0
Fχs(2
RsγeC − 1)fχe(γe)dγe, (19)
where C =
√
e
2pi . Substituting (14) and (15) in (19) and using
[41, (8.352.4)], we get
PSp−Inout =
N
Γ(me)
[
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
]me
×
N−1∑
w=0
(
N − 1
w
)
(−1)w
Γ(me)Γ(ms)
×M(Ψ1,Ψ3).
(20)
where Ψ3 =
(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC−1)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
.
3) Integrated Receiver at S and Separated Receiver at E:
In this case, the main link has an asymptotic achievable rate of
Cs = log2(χs) +
1
2 log2
e
2pi [3], [42], whereas the achievable
rate for the wiretapper is Ce = log2(1 + χe). Then using a
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similar approach to (17) and after some manipulations, the
outage probability is given as
P In−Spout = 1−
∫
∞
2Rs
C
Fχe
(
γsC
2Rs
− 1
)
fχs(γs)dγs. (21)
Substituting (13) and (15) in (21) and using the binomial
theorem, we get
P In−Spout = 1−
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
T (Ψ4,Ψ5),
(22)
where T (a, b) = ∫∞
2Rs/C
Γ(me,mea)
z(γs)
ms−1 exp(−msb)dγs
involves a single integral and can be readily evaluated
in any computational software. Furthermore, Ψ4 =
(Ωeρeδ
2
e+ρeN0+σ
2
e)(
γsC
2Rs
−1)
ρe(1−δ2e)γ¯e
and Ψ5 =
(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
.
4) Integrated Receivers at S and E: In this case the
main and wiretap links have asymptotic achievable rates of
Cs = log2(χs) +
1
2 log2
e
2pi and Ce = log2(χe) +
1
2 log2
e
2pi ,
respectively [3]. Then using the same approach as that for
deriving (17), we obtain
P In−Inout = 1−
∫
∞
2Rs
Fχe
( γs
2Rs
)
fχs(γs)dγs. (23)
Replacing (13) and (15) in (23) and after some algebraic
manipulations, we obtain
P In−Inout = 1−
N∑
z=0
(
N
z
)
(−1)z
Γ(ms)Γ(me)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
T (Ψ6,Ψ5),
(24)
where Ψ6 =
(Ωeρeδ
2
e+ρeN0+σ
2
e)
γs
2Rs
ρe(1−δ2e)γ¯e
.
B. Cooperative Eavesdroppers
For the case of cooperative eavesdropping, the N eaves-
droppers share information to form a virtual antenna array for
receive beamforming such that a single-input multiple-output
(SIMO) channel exists between the AP and the eavesdroppers
[19]. The combined message ensures the maximum achievable
rate of the wiretap link. In this case the instantaneous SNR of
the combined wiretap signal can be written as
χe =
N∑
i=1
χie. (25)
The PDF of χe can be written as [43]
fχe(γe) =
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme γNme−1e
Γ(Nme)
× exp(−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
γ¯e). (26)
The CDF of the sum of independent, identically-distributed
Gamma random variables is expressed as [38]
Fχe(γe) = 1− exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)
×
Nme−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γe
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)r
.
(27)
1) Separated Receivers at S and E: Using (26) and (15) in
(17) and with the help of [41, (8.352.4)], the secrecy outage
probability for this case is expressed as
PSp−Spout = 1−
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
U(Ψ1,Ψ2),
(28)
where U(a, b) = ∫∞
0
γNme−1e
Γ(Nme)
exp(−mea)Γ(Nme,msb)Γ(Nme) dγe.
2) Separated Receiver at S, Integrated Receiver at E: Sub-
stituting (26) and (15) into (19), the secrecy outage probability
for this case is expressed as
PSp−Inout = 1−
∫
∞
0
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
× γ
Nme−1
e
Γ(Nme)
exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
γ¯e
)
× exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC − 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
×
ms−1∑
r=0
1
r!
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)(2
RsγeC − 1)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]r
dγe.
(29)
After some simplifications and using [41, (8.352.4)], the
secrecy outage probability is expressed as
PSp−Inout = 1−
(
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e
)Nme
U(Ψ1,Ψ3).
(30)
3) Integrated Receiver at S and Separated Receiver at
E: Substituting (27) and (15) in (21), the secrecy outage
probability for this case is expressed as
P In−Spout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
−
∫
∞
2Rs
C
exp
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γsC
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
+
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
)
×
Nme−1∑
r=0
1
r!
×
(
−me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)γsC
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
+
me(Ωeρeδ
2
e + ρeN0 + σ
2
e)
ρe(1− δ2e)γ¯e2Rs
)r
(γs)
ms−1
Γ(ms)
×
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
× exp
(
−ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s + ρsN0 + σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1− δ2s)γ¯s
)
dγs. (31)
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After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
P In−Spout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
−
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
Γ(ms)
V(Ψ4,Ψ5), (32)
where V(a, b) = ∫∞2Rs
C
(γs)
ms−1 exp(−msa)Γ(Nms,meb)
Γ(Nms)
dγs.
4) Integrated Receivers at S and E: Replacing (27) and
(15) in (23) and using a similar approach as for the derivation
of 32, the secrecy outage probability for this case is expressed
as
P In−Inout = 1−
Γ(ms,
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)γs
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
)
Γ(ms)
−
[
ms(Ωsρsδ
2
s+ρsN0+σ
2
s)
ρs(1−δ2s)γ¯s
]ms
Γ(ms)
V(Ψ6,Ψ5). (33)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We now provide some numerical results to validate the
analytical expressions derived in Section III. The system
parameters provided in Table I are used for result generation,
unless stated otherwise.
S No. Simulation Parameter Value
1. Channel Realizations 105
2. Antenna Noise Variance N0 0.1 dB
3. Signal Processing Noise Variance σ2
s
= σ2
e
0 dB
4. Target Secrecy Rate Rs 1 bit/sec/Hz
5. Main Link Power Ωs 30 dB
6. Wiretap Link Power Ωe 10 dB
7. Nakagami-m shape factor ms = me 2
8. Power splitting factor ρs = ρe 0.8
9. Channel estimation accuracy δs = δe 0.2
10. No. of eavesdroppers N 5
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy performance for different com-
binations of receiver architectures at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdroppers. Fig. 3(a) shows that for any given
value of γ¯s, the smallest secrecy outage probability is achieved
when S is equipped with a separated and E with an integrated
receiver architecture. on the other hand, the secrecy outage
probability is the largest for the case when S is equipped
with an integrated and E with a separated architecture, all
other parameters remaining un-changed. The figure also shows
that the outage probability increases with cooperation between
the eavesdroppers. Fig. 3(a) shows that by increasing γ¯s a
steady reduction in the outage probability can be achieved.
However, at large values (γ¯s > 28 dB), an outage floor is
introduced for both the cooperative and non-cooperative cases,
which shows that the outage probability does not decrease
despite an increase in the main link SNR. This floor appears
because of the channel estimation errors for the main link.
By comparing Figs. 3(a) & (b), it can be observed that
by increasing the target rate Rs, for a fixed γ¯s, the outage
probability increases for all receiver architecture combinations.
Finally, comparing the two sub-figures also reveals that the
difference between the outage performance with and without
eavesdropper cooperation diminishes as Rs is increased from
1 to 2 bps/Hz. All graphs shown in the figures exhibit a good
match between the simulation and analytical results, which
validates the accuracy of our derived analytical expressions.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability surface plotted
against γ¯s and the Nakagami-m parameter, for different re-
ceiver architectures at S and E. Figure 4(a), for the case of
non-cooperative eavesdroppers, shows that the secrecy outage
probability decreases with an increase in ms = me, which
corresponds to a decreasing severity of the channel fading.
Moreover, the figure shows that progressively larger values of
the Nakagami parameter (ms = me = m > 2, result in an
increasing difference between the secrecy outage probabilities
achieved by the 4 receiver combinations; the combination of
S separated and E integrated receivers has the smallest outage
as already observed in Fig. 3. By comparing Fig. 4(b), i.e., co-
operative eavesdroppers with Fig. 4(a) for the non-cooperating
case, it can be observed that for a given γs and identical
system parameters, cooperation between the eavesdroppers
significantly increases the secrecy outage probability relative
to that for the non-cooperative case.
Fig. 5 shows the impact of the PS factor ρ on the secrecy
outage probability. To separately demonstrate the effect of PS
at S only, ρs is varied while the PS factor at the eavesdroppers
is fixed at ρe = 0.5. Another set of curves shown in Fig.
5 describe the effect of PS at eavesdroppers only, while
ρs = 0.5 is maintained for those curves. The figure shows
that by increasing values of ρs the secrecy outage probability
decreases. This is because a larger fraction of the received
power is then used for ID at S. In contrast, the secrecy outage
probability increases with increasing values of ρe. This is
due to the fact that more power is then allocated by the
eavesdroppers to decode the secret message, which diminishes
the system’s secrecy performance.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of the channel estimation errors on
the secrecy outage probability. Figs. 6(a),(b) show that an in-
crease in δs, the legitimate receiver’s estimation error, degrades
the secrecy performance. Whereas, Figs. 6(c),(d) show that an
increase in δe, the eavesdropping receiver’s estimation error,
reduces the secrecy outage probability. This follows from the
fact that the secrecy outage event is dependent on the decoding
ability of both the legitimate and the eavesdropper nodes. An
imperfect channel estimate at the eavesdropper increases its
likelihood of incorrect decoding of the secret message, which
reduces the information leakage. One may also observe from
the figure that an increasing error in CSI estimate of the higher
SNR main link has a more dominant effect on the secrecy
outage probability than a similar increase in CSI error on the
wiretapping receivers. This can be verified by comparing the
relative shift in the secrecy outage curves between Fig. 6(a)
and (b) with the relative shift in the secrecy outage between
Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 6(d). This effect is more pronounced for the
cooperating eavesdroppers case.
Fig. 7 shows the energy-secrecy capacity tradeoff for both
cooperative as well as non-cooperative eavesdroppers. Each
tradeoff curve is generated by varying ρs between 0.01 and
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Fig. 3. Comparison of secrecy performance between different SWIPT receiver architectures. (a) Rs = 1 bps/Hz (b) Rs = 2 bps/Hz.
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Fig. 4. Effect of Nakagami-m parameter and eavesdropper cooperation on secrecy performance, δs = δe = 0.1. (a) Non-cooperative eavesdroppers (b)
Cooperative eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 5. Effect of power splitting factor ρ on the secrecy outage probability.
0.99 with fixed ρe = 0.5. However, plotting of each curve
in Fig. 7 is restricted to its respective ρs sub-interval that
produces a non-negative secrecy capacity. This results in
different energy levels, harvested according to (1−ρs), at zero
secrecy capacity as shown in Fig. 7. One may observe from
the figure that the enhanced eavesdropper performance due
to cooperation diminishes the harvested energy conditional on
a non-negative secrecy capacity. The figure also shows that
δs = δe = 0.001 achieves a better energy-secrecy operating
point than that of δs = δe = 0.2, which highlights the
significance of having an accurate CSI estimate at the main
receiver. Moreover, the figure shows that when the number
of eavesdroppers N increases from 5 to 10, the area of the
energy-secrecy capacity region decreases significantly for both
the cooperative as well as the non-cooperative eavesdroppers.
Finally, for a fixed number of eavesdroppers, the energy-
secrecy capacity region for non-cooperative eavesdroppers
is larger than that of the cooperative eavesdroppers. This
highlights the fact that cooperation among the eavesdroppers
considerably degrades the secrecy performance of the system.
V. CONCLUSION
This work has investigated the secrecy outage probability
for a SWIPT system operating in the presence of cooperative
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Fig. 7. Energy-Secrecy Capacity Region. ρs varied between 0.01 and 0.99,
ρe = 0.5 and ζe = ζs = 0.8.
eavesdroppers and different combinations of the SWIPT re-
ceiver architectures considered at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdroppers. We derived closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage probability for each of these cases and showed
that the smallest secrecy outage probability is achieved when
the legitimate receiver has a separated architecture and the
eavesdroppers have an integrated SWIPT receiver. The worst-
case scenario is when the legitimate receiver has an integrated
architecture and the eavesdroppers have separated SWIPT
architectures; for a high main link SNR and Nakagami-
m = 4, it was shown that the secrecy outage probabilities
achieved for these two extreme cases differ by an order of
magnitude. The effect of channel estimation errors was also
investigated and it was shown that for the main link average
SNR greater than 28 dB, an outage floor appears, i.e., the
secrecy outage probability cannot be reduced further due to
the channel estimation errors, despite an increase in the main
link SNR. Finally, it was shown that cooperation between
the eavesdroppers significantly increases the secrecy outage
probability relative to that of the non-cooperative case for any
combination of receiver architectures. Our results are useful
for analyzing the secrecy performance of different SWIPT
receiver architectures and eavesdropper cooperation.
SUBMITTED TO WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE COMPUTING 9
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported by the EU-funded project ATOM-
690750, approved under call H2020-MSCA-RISE-2015.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Krikidis, S. Timotheou, S. Nikolaou, G. Zheng, D. W. K. Ng, and
R. Schober, “Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
in modern communication systems,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 52, no. 11, pp. 104–110, 2014.
[2] K. Huang and E. Larsson, “Simultaneous information and power transfer
for broadband wireless systems,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Process-
ing, vol. 61, no. 23, pp. 5972–5986, 2013.
[3] X. Zhou, R. Zhang, and C. K. Ho, “Wireless information and power
transfer: Architecture design and rate-energy tradeoff,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Communications, vol. 61, no. 11, pp. 4754–4767, 2013.
[4] L. R. Varshney, “Transporting information and energy simultaneously,”
in proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2008,
pp. 1612–1616.
[5] P. Grover and A. Sahai, “Shannon meets Tesla: Wireless information and
power transfer,” in proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory, 2010, pp. 2363–2367.
[6] L. Liu, R. Zhang, and K.-C. Chua, “Wireless information transfer
with opportunistic energy harvesting,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 288–300, 2013.
[7] Z. Xiang and M. Tao, “Robust beamforming for wireless information
and power transmission,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, vol. 1,
no. 4, pp. 372–375, 2012.
[8] K. Huang and V. K. Lau, “Enabling wireless power transfer in cellular
networks: Architecture, modeling and deployment,” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 902–912, 2014.
[9] S. Lee, R. Zhang, and K. Huang, “Opportunistic wireless energy
harvesting in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 12, no. 9, pp. 4788–4799, 2013.
[10] G. De Meulenaer, F. Gosset, F.-X. Standaert, and O. Pereira, “On the
energy cost of communication and cryptography in wireless sensor
networks,” in proc. IEEE International Conference on Wireless and
Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, 2008, pp. 580–
585.
[11] K. Cumanan, H. Xing, P. Xu, G. Zheng, X. Dai, A. Nallanathan, Z. Ding,
and G. K. Karagiannidis, “Physical layer security jamming: Theoretical
limits and practical designs in wireless networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5,
pp. 3603–3611, 2017.
[12] B. Juan, X. Tao, J. Xu, X. Zhang, and Q. Zhang, “Relay selection for
secrecy connectivity in random wireless networks,” Wireless Communi-
cations and Mobile Computing, vol. 16, no. 15, pp. 2263–2273, 2016.
[13] D. Deng, X. Li, L. Fan, W. Zhou, R. Qingyang Hu, and Z. Zhou,
“Secrecy analysis of multiuser untrusted amplify-and-forward relay
networks,” Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, vol. 2017,
2017, Article ID 9580639.
[14] X. He and A. Yener, “Secure degrees of freedom for Gaussian channels
with interference: Structured codes outperform Gaussian signaling,” in
proc. IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[15] Y. Zou, X. Wang, and W. Shen, “Physical-layer security with multiuser
scheduling in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Transactions on Commu-
nications, vol. 61, no. 12, pp. 5103–5113, 2013.
[16] Z. Shu, Y. Qian, and S. Ci, “On physical layer security for cognitive
radio networks,” IEEE Network, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 28–33, 2013.
[17] H. Sakran, M. Shokair, O. Nasr, S. El-Rabaie, and A. A. El-Azm,
“Proposed relay selection scheme for physical layer security in cognitive
radio networks,” IET Communications, vol. 6, no. 16, pp. 2676–2687,
2012.
[18] K. Cumanan, Z. Ding, M. Xu, and H. V. Poor, “Secrecy rate optimization
for secure multicast communications,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 1417–1432, Dec 2016.
[19] P. C. Pinto, J. Barros, and M. Z. Win, “Secure communication in
stochastic wireless networksPart I: Connectivity,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 125–138, 2012.
[20] J. P. Vilela, M. Bloch, J. Barros, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wireless se-
crecy regions with friendly jamming,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 256–266, 2011.
[21] O. O. Koyluoglu, C. E. Koksal, and H. El Gamal, “On secrecy capacity
scaling in wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 3000–3015, 2012.
[22] N. Romero-Zurita, M. Ghogho, and D. McLernon, “Outage probability
based power distribution between data and artificial noise for physical
layer security,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 71–
74, 2012.
[23] G. Zheng, L.-C. Choo, and K.-K. Wong, “Optimal cooperative jamming
to enhance physical layer security using relays,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1317–1322, 2011.
[24] K. Cumanan, G. C. Alexandropoulos, Z. Ding, and G. K. Karagiannidis,
“Secure communications with cooperative jamming: Optimal power
allocation and secrecy outage analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2017.
[25] Y. Liu, J. Li, and A. P. Petropulu, “Destination assisted cooperative
jamming for wireless physical-layer security,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 682–694, 2013.
[26] Y. Yang, Q. Li, W.-K. Ma, J. Ge, and P. Ching, “Cooperative secure
beamforming for AF relay networks with multiple eavesdroppers,” IEEE
Signal Processing Letters, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 35–38, 2013.
[27] H. Yu, S. Guo, Y. Yang, and B. Xiao, “Optimal target secrecy rate
and power allocation policy for a swipt system over a fading wiretap
channel,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–12, 2017.
[28] F. Jameel and S. Wyne, “Secrecy outage of SWIPT in the presence of
cooperating eavesdroppers,” AEU-International Journal of Electronics
and Communications, vol. 77, pp. 23–26, 2017.
[29] B. Fang, Z. Qian, W. Zhong, and W. Shao, “AN-aided secrecy precoding
for SWIPT in cognitive MIMO broadcast channels,” IEEE Communica-
tions Letters, vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 1632–1635, 2015.
[30] M. Zhang, Y. Liu, and R. Zhang, “Artificial noise aided secrecy
information and power transfer in OFDMA systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 3085–3096, 2016.
[31] Q. Li, Q. Zhang, and J. Qin, “Secure relay beamforming for simulta-
neous wireless information and power transfer in nonregenerative relay
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 63, no. 5,
pp. 2462–2467, 2014.
[32] X. Chen, D. W. K. Ng, and H.-H. Chen, “Secrecy wireless informa-
tion and power transfer: Challenges and opportunities,” IEEE Wireless
Communications, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 54–61, 2016.
[33] F. Jameel, S. Wyne, and I. Krikidis, “Secrecy Outage for Wireless Sensor
Networks,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 21, no. 7, pp. 1565–
1568, 2017.
[34] H. Zhang, Y. Huang, C. Li, and L. Yang, “Secure beamforming design
for SWIPT in MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages and
external eavesdroppers,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 7807–7819, 2016.
[35] Y. Isukapalli and B. D. Rao, “Packet error probability of a transmit
beamforming system with imperfect feedback,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 2298–2314, 2010.
[36] T. Yoo and A. Goldsmith, “Capacity and power allocation for fading
MIMO channels with channel estimation error,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 2203–2214, 2006.
[37] G. K. Karagiannidis, D. A. Zogas, and S. A. Kotsopoulos, “On the mul-
tivariate Nakagami-m distribution with exponential correlation,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 1240–1244, 2003.
[38] R. Morsi, D. S. Michalopoulos, and R. Schober, “Multiuser scheduling
schemes for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
over fading channels,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 1967–1982, 2015.
[39] F. Jameel, S. Wyne, and Z. Ding, “Secure communications in three-step
two-way energy harvesting DF relaying,” IEEE Communications Letters,
vol. pp, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2017.
[40] M.-N. Nguyen, N.-P. Nguyen, D. B. Da Costa, H.-K. Nguyen, and R. T.
De Sousa, “Secure cooperative half-duplex cognitive radio networks with
k-th best relay selection,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 6678–6687, 2017.
[41] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of integrals, series, and
products, 8th ed. Academic press, 2014.
[42] A. Lapidoth, S. M. Moser, and M. A. Wigger, “On the capacity of
free-space optical intensity channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 55, no. 10, pp. 4449–4461, 2009.
[43] V. A. Aalo, “Performance of maximal-ratio diversity systems in a
correlated nakagami-fading environment,” IEEE Transactions on Com-
munications, vol. 43, no. 8, pp. 2360–2369, 1995.
